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Casenote
BE KIND, PLEASE REWIND - THE SECOND CIRCUIT GIVES
CABLE PROVIDERS SOMETHING TO WATCH IN
CARTOON NETWORK L.P. V
CSC HOLDINGS, INC.
I. INTRODUCTION
According to The Nielsen Company, television viewing has
reached an "all-time high."1 As television viewing increases, the
percentage of viewers using a Digital Video Recorder ("DVR") has
also increased. 2 Currently, around thirty-four percent of American
households use a DVR of some kind.3 DVRs allow viewers to watch
previously aired television content at their convenience, radically
changing how people watch television. 4
1. See Taylor Gandossy, TV Viewing at 'All-time High,' Nielsen Says, CNN.coM,
http://www.cnn.com/2009/SHOWBIZ/TV/O2/24/us.video.nielsen/ (last visited
Oct. 31, 2009) (providing Nielsen's Quarterly A2/M2 Three Screen Report on
video viewership); see generally Nielsen Television Overview, http://en-us.nielsen.
com/tab/measurement/tv_research (last visited Oct. 31, 2009) ("Nielsen mea-
sures over 40% of the world's TV viewing behavior). In addition to Television
viewership, the "Three Screen Report" also measures the "[v]iewership of videos
on the Internet and on mobile phones." Gandossy, supra. The Report concluded
that the average American television viewer watches more than 151 hours of televi-
sion in a month. See id. The Report also determined that an increase of Digital
Video Recorder (DVR) viewership has contributed to the overall rise in viewing.
See id. "With a DVR, you can easily record your favorite shows without tapes, with-
out a VCR, or without troublesome timers. With the touch of a button, you can
pause live TV, view an instant replay, rewind your favorite scenes, or play your show
in slow motion." Comcast FAQs, http://www.comcast.com/Customers/FAQ/Faq
Details.ashx?ld=1822 (last visited Oct. 31, 2009).
2. See Brian Stelter, A New Ratings System Stirs Up the Fall TV Season, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 8, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/08/business/media/08ratings.
html (noting increasing use of DVR and its impact on ratings); see also Bill
Gorman, DVR Viewership Up 64% in Broadcast Primetime, TVBYTHENUMBERS.COM,
May 8, 2008, http://tvbythenumbers.com/2008/05/08/dvr-viewership-up-64-in-
broadcast-primetime/3679 (calculating DVR usage during primetime broadcasts).
Gorman concluded DVR usage might have a major impact on TV viewership, as
viewership has increased 64% over the past year. See Gorman, supra.
3. See Richard Mullins, DVR Fallout: More People Delaying Season Premiere Watch-
ing, TAMPA TIUt., Mar. 12, 2009, http://www2.tbo.com/content/2009/mar/12/
dvr-fallout-more-people-delaying-season-premiere-w/news-metro (reporting per-
centage of Americans who use DVR services). Even though individuals often want
to watch a season premier when it is first aired, their busy schedules often conflict
with scheduled times. See id.
4. See Cartoon Network L.P. v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 123 (2d Cir.
2008) (noting DVRs' increasing role in modern television viewing).
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In March 2006, Cablevision Systems Corporation ("Cablevi-
sion") announced a technologically new DVR, the Remote Storage
DVR ("RS-DVR"). 5 Cablevision provides digital cable to much of
the New York metropolitan area and surrounding parts. 6 The new
RS-DVR records media content for digital cable consumers who do
not have a stand-alone DVR by storing the recorded content on
central hard drives in a "remote" location maintained by Cablevi-
sion. 7 The RS-DVR will revolutionize DVRs because customers will
no longer need their stand-alone DVR system to record their favor-
ite shows. 8 Cablevision informed its content providers of the RS-
DVR without seeking licenses from the providers to operate or sell
the RS-DVR and the content providers filed suit.9 The suit eventu-
ally reached the Second Circuit, which ruled that there was no vio-
lation of the content providers' copyrights.10
This note examines the Second Circuit's decision in Cartoon
Network L.P. v. CSC Holdings, Inc ("Cartoon Network").11 Section II
presents the underlying facts of the case. 12 Section III provides im-
portant history of the Copyright Act and relevant case law. 13 Sec-
tion IV summarizes the Second Circuit's decision. 14 Section V
5. See Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 124 (reporting Cablevision announcement
of its new RS-DVR). Cablevision is one of the nation's largest telecommunications,
media and entertainment companies. See Cablevision, Corporate Information, http:/
/www.cablevision.com/about/index.jsp (last visited Oct. 31, 2009) (establishing
Cablevision as "single largest cable cluster, passing more than 4.7 million house-
holds and 600,000 businesses"). Cablevision owns and operates the legendary
Madison Square Garden among other assets. See id. For a further discussion of
how the RS-DVR operates, see infra notes 18-26 and accompanying text.
6. See Cablevision, supra note 5 (detailing Cablevision's operations). Cur-
rently, Cablevision is the fifth largest cable provider in the United States. See Na-
tional Cable & Telecommunications Association, Top 25 MSOs, http://www.ncta.
com/Stats/TopMSOs.aspx (last visited Oct. 31, 2009) (ranking cable providers'
distribution nationwide).
7. See Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 124 (describing RS-DVR).
8. See id. at 123-24 (comparing stand-alone DVRs with RS-DVRs). Many com-
panies, like TiVo, manufacture and sell stand-alone DVRs that connect straight to
the cable box. See id. at 123. Cable companies also provide to their customers set-
top DVRs, a combination of the cable box and a stand-alone DVR. See id.
9. See id. at 124 (describing basis for disagreement between Cablevision and
its content providers).
10. See id. at 140 (holding that Cablevision's RS-DVR would not directly vio-
late content providers' exclusive rights of reproduction and public performance).
11. Id.
12. For a further discussion of the facts and procedural history in Cartoon Net-
work, see infra notes 16-35 and accompanying text.
13. For a further discussion of history of the Copyright Act and relevant case
law, see infra notes 36-93 and accompanying text.
14. For a further discussion of the Second Circuit's opinion, see infra notes
94-132 and accompanying text.
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analyzes the court's decision, concluding that its ruling relies on
sound legal principles. 15 Finally, Section VI discusses the potential
impact of the decision on both copyright law and technology. 16
II. PAUSE: FACTS OF THE CASE
Content providers transmit their television programs through a
single stream to Cablevision and other cable companies which in
turn are immediately re-transmitted to subscribing customers. 17
The proposed RS-DVR will split the single stream of data into two
separate streams.18 The first stream is routed directly to the cus-
tomer, while the second stream enters a Broadband Media Router
("BMR") that "buffers the data stream, reformats it, and sends it to
the 'Arroyo Server,' which consists, in relevant part, of two data
buffers and a number of high-capacity hard disks." 19 Next, the
stream enters the first buffer, or the "primary ingest buffer," where
the server determines if any customers wish to record any portion
of the program.20 When a customer wants to record programming,
the stream moves into the secondary buffer and is then recorded
onto one of the hard disks for later playback. 21 The primary ingest
buffer continually erases and replaces data every tenth of a second
while holding no more than 1.2 seconds of data at any given time. 22
To watch a show, the customer selects their previously re-
corded show from an on-screen list.23 The Arroyo Server identifies
the corresponding copy of the program and streams it to the cus-
15. For a critical analysis of the court's opinion in Cartoon Network, see infra
notes 133-183 and accompanying text.
16. For a further discussion of the impact the decision will have on copyright
law and technology, see infra notes 184-194 and accompanying text.
17. See Cartoon Network L.P. v. CSC Holdings, Inc. 536 F.3d 121, 124 (2d Cir.
2008) ("Thus, if a Cartoon Network program is scheduled to air Monday night at
8pm, Cartoon Network transmits that program's data to Cablevision and other
cable companies nationwide at that time, and the cable companies immediately re-
transmit the data to customers who subscribe to that channel.").
18. See id. (noting that stream is split by Cablevision before reaching
customer).
19. Id.
20. See id. (stating purpose of primary ingest buffer).
21. See id. (discussing where stream goes after first buffer).
22. See id. at 124-25 ("Thus, every tenth of a second, the data residing on this
buffer are automatically erased and replaced. The data buffer in the BMR holds
no more than 1.2 seconds of programming at any time."). Because the content is
continuously overwritten, it is not in the program for more than those 1.2 seconds.
See id.
23. See id. at 125 (explaining playback process for customers).
2010]
3
Hamner: Be Kind, Please Rewind - The Second Circuit Gives Cable Providers
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2010
138 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JouRNAL [Vol. 17: p. 135
tomer for viewing.24 The RS-DVR is similar to a Video On Demand
("VOD") Service because content for both services is stored by the
cable company at a remote location, whereas a regular DVR system
stores its content on the customer's individual cable box.25 With
the RS-DVR technology, a customer can only record programs of-
fered by Cablevision and subscribed to by the customer. 26
This dispute arose when Cablevision informed its content prov-
iders of the new RS-DVR. 27 Subsequently, multiple content provid-
ers filed suit against Cablevision seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief.28 The content providers alleged that Cablevision's proposed
RS-DVR "would directly infringe their exclusive rights to both
reproduce and publicly perform their copyrighted works."29 More-
over, the content providers only claimed direct infringement, waiv-
ing any claim of contributory infringement, while Cablevision
agreed that it would not raise the fair use defense. 30
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York granted summary judgment for the content providers
and enjoined Cablevision from using the RS-DVR without the ap-
propriate licenses.31 The district court held that the RS-DVR would
make copies of the content by storing its data in the primary ingest
buffer, resulting in direct infringement of the content providers'
exclusive rights of reproduction. 32 The district court also held that
the Arroyo Server would directly infringe the content providers' re-
production rights.33 Finally, the court found that the RS-DVR
would directly infringe on the content providers' exclusive rights of
public performance when it transmitted the previously recorded
24. SeeJeff Baumgartner, Inside Cablevision's 'RS-DVR" CABLE DIGITAL NEWS,
Apr. 11, 2007, http://www.lightreading.com/document.asp?doc id=121644&page
_number=2 (describing how Arroyo Server sends copied data to customer). "It's at
this point that the customer can watch the recorded program and can move
around the asset using trick modes (pause, fast-forward, rewind, etc.)." Id.
25. See Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 125. (drawing similarities between RS-DVR
and VOD services). Both VOD and the RS-DVR services incorporate data being
stored by the cable providers. See id. "But unlike a VOD service, RS-DVR users can
only play content that they previously requested to be recorded." See id.
26. See id. (noting limitations imposed by Cablevision on customer).
27. See id. at 124 (describing basis for disagreement between Cablevision and
its content providers).
28. See id. (introducing content providers' action against Cablevision).
29. Id.
30. See id. (detailing content of plaintiffs' theories and that defendants agreed
not to raise fair use defense).
31. See id. (reviewing procedural history of noted case).
32. See id. at 125 (stating district court's reasoning for decision in favor of
plaintiffs).
33. See id. (explaining district court's reasons for finding for plaintiffs).
4
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 17, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol17/iss1/4
BE KIND, PLEASE REWIND
data to the customer.3 4 Cablevision appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.35
III. CHANNEL GUIDE: A HISTORY OF THE COPYRIGHT Acr
A. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act
Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution provides Congress with
the power "[t] o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries. '36 The intent of
this limited grant of monopoly privilege is to encourage the author
and inventor's creativity through reward. 3 7 Nonetheless, "[t]he
sole interest of the United States and the primary object in confer-
ring the monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the public
from the labors of authors. ' 38 Herein lays the difficulty of balanc-
ing the competing interests of preserving the rights of the authors
and inventors against promoting the free exchange of ideas, infor-
mation and commerce for the public benefit.3 9
Copyright protection is "wholly statutory."40 Although it is the
"role of the Congress, not the courts, to formulate new principles of
copyright law when the legislature has determined that technologi-
cal innovations have made them necessary," a defendant is not "im-
mune from liability for copyright infringement simply because the
technologies are of recent origin or are being applied to innovative
uses."4 1 Additionally, "[t]he Copyright Act does not expressly
34. See id. (describing how data transfer directly infringed on content provid-
ers' exclusive right of public performance).
35. See id. at 126 (summarizing procedural history of case).
36. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
37. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429
(1984) (noting public purpose of limited grant).
38. Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932).
39. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 429 (stating competing interests in copyright law); see
also MGM Studios, Inc., v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 928-29 (2005) (remarking
on tension between two values). See generally Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright and Con-
trol Over New Technologies of Dissemination, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 1613 (2001) (discuss-
ing balancing interests). Furthermore, "imposing liability, not only on infringers
but on distributors of software based on its potential for unlawful use, could limit
further development of beneficial technologies." Grokster, 545 U.S. at 929. The
Court, in Grokster, mentioned the public contempt for copyright protection limit-
ing ease of use and the likelihood of the public becoming directly involved in
copyright policy to offset their disdain. See id.
40. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 431 (citing Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 661-62
(1834)) (noting that statutory law provides basis for copyright protection).
41. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Redd Home, Inc., 749 F.2d 154, 157 (3d
Cir. 1984); see also Sony, 464 U.S. at 430-31 (discussing legislative pursuits in copy-
2010]
5
Hamner: Be Kind, Please Rewind - The Second Circuit Gives Cable Providers
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2010
140 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
render anyone liable for infringement committed by another. '42
Consequently, the Copyright Act protects authors and inventors
from infringers and does not hold people liable for infringement
by others. 43
B. Copying a Work
The Copyright Act gives the owner of a copyright, among other
rights, the exclusive right "to reproduce the copyrighted work in
copies." 44 The Copyright Act defines "copies" as "material objects
. . . in which a work is fixed by any method now known or later
developed, and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced,
or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a ma-
chine or device." 45 A work is "fixed" when it is "embodied" in a
medium "for a period of more than a transitory duration."4 6 Some
courts have required a volitional or causal relationship between the
copying and the infringer to find direct liability, while other circuits
have not followed this requirement.47
Copyrighted data loaded onto a computer's random access
memory ("RAM") constitutes copyright infringement.48 In MAI Sys-
tems Corp. v. Peak Computer Inc., ("MA] Systems") the Ninth Circuit
rejected Peak's argument that the loading of copyrighted software
into RAM did not result in a copy being fixed.49 The court rea-
right law); Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 414 (1974) (indicating
problems of adjudicating copyright claims involving new technology).
42. Sony, 464 U.S. at 434. Contributory infringement, however, bridges the
gap between direct infringement and no violation. See id. at 435.
43. See id at 434-34 (discussing Copyright Act).
44. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2008) (providing copyright owners' exclusive rights).
45. Id. § 101.
46. Id.
47. Compare Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'ns Servs., Inc.,
907 F. Supp. 1361, 1370 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (requiring volitional conduct in copy-
right infringement action), and CoStar Group, Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544,
550 (4th Cir. 2004) (noting causal relationship between infringer and infringing
conduct), with Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Webbworld, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 543, 550
(N.D. Tex. 1997) (holding that copyright infringement does not require intent or
any particular state of mind), affd, 168 F.3d 486 (5th Cir. 1999) (unpublished
table decision).
48. See, e.g., MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518-19 (9th
Cir. 1993) (finding RAM copies in violation of copyrights); Stenograph L.L.C. v.
Bossard Assocs., Inc., 144 F.3d 96, 101-02 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that loading
software onto RAM creates copies); Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware
Eng'g & Consulting, Inc., 421 F.3d 1307, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (stating that copy is
created through computer's RAM).
49. See 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993) (rejecting Peak's argument that
RAM copy does not constitute infringement). The court found no evidence that
the copy was not fixed. See id. The loading of software into a computer, however,
is generally regarded as the creation of a copy. See id. at 519 (citing multiple
[Vol. 17: p. 135
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soned that because the RAM copy could be "perceived, reproduced,
or otherwise communicated," the RAM copy qualified as a copy
under the Copyright Act.50 Therefore, the court deemed the RAM
copy "fixed."5'
Volitional conduct or causation is required to directly infringe
copyrights. 52 In Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Commu-
nications Services, ("Netcom") the court found no direct liability for a
third party who maintained an internet service provider ("ISP") sys-
tem being used to host user-supplied copyrighted works. 53 The
court stated that holding Netcom liable for direct copyright in-
fringement would result in unreasonable liability.54 On this basis,
the court determined that "some element of volition or causation"
in creating the copy was necessary to find direct infringement. 55
Following the Netcom decision, Congress enacted the Online
Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act, which provided
safe-harbors for ISPs from copyright infringement committed by its
users.56 The ISP must meet certain requirements before it can take
advantage of the safe-harbors, and must be involved in blocking re-
sources that conclude loading software onto computer constitutes copying under
Copyright Act).
50. See id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101) (explaining court's reasoning for finding
copyright infringement). "The law also support[ed] the conclusion that Peak's
loading of copyrighted software into RAM creates a 'copy' of that software in viola-
tion of the Copyright Act." Id. at 518.
51. See id. at 519 (examining features of RAM).
52. See, e.g., Religious Tech Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'ns Servs., 907 F.
Supp. 1361, 1370 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (referencing court's requirement of volitional
or causational conduct to satisfy direct infringement); CoStar Group, Inc. v. Loop-
net, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 549-50 (4th Cir. 2004) (requiring causal relationship be-
tween copying and machine owner).
53. See 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1368 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (explaining Netcom's sys-
tems functions).
54. See id. at 1369 ("Plaintiffs' theory would create many separate acts of in-
fringement and, carried to its natural extreme, would lead to unreasonable liabil-
ity."). Contributory infringement is the correct theory for determining a machine
owner's liability for others' directly infringing conduct. See id. The defendants in
Netcom only owned and provided a system for others to use. See id. at 1369-70.
55. Id. at 1370. Requiring volitional conduct or causation helps to separate
the differences between contributory infringement and direct infringement. See
id. at 1369; see also CoStar, 373 F.3d at 551 (indicating that volitional or causation
element furthers purpose of Copyright Act).
56. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 ("A service provider shall not be liable [...] for in-
fringement of copyright by reason of the provider's transmitting, routing, or pro-
viding connections for, material through a system or network controlled or
operated by or for the service provider. . . ."). The legislation only applies to cer-
tain ISPs. See id. § 512 (a)-(d) (providing safe harbor to transitory digital network
communications, system caching, information residing on systems or networks at
direction of users and information location tools).
20101
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peat infringers and taking appropriate steps to prevent
infringement. 57
Moreover, a party must actually engage in infringing conduct
for a court to find direct copyright infringement.58 The Fourth Cir-
cuit, in CoStar Group, Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc., ("CoSta9?') required a
"nexus sufficiently close and causal" existing between the illegal
copying and the machine owner to find actual infringement.59 The
court noted that the Copyright Act does not extend direct liability
to third parties; rather, liability follows the party "who actually en-
gages in infringing conduct - the one who directly violates the
prohibitions. '60 Loopnet, an ISP, provided a website where users
copied and displayed CoStar's copyright protected photographs. 61
The court reasoned that holding persons "involved in the owner-
ship, operation, or maintenance of a transmission facility that auto-
matically records material - copyrighted or not" liable for direct
infringement "would miss the thrust of the protections afforded by
the Copyright Act."'62
An automated service, however, is liable for copyright infringe-
ment when the service is more than a passive actor.63 In Playboy
Enterprises v. Webbworld, the Fifth Circuit, affirming a district court
opinion without publishing its own decision, upheld direct liability
for copyright infringement by an automated service.64 The district
57. See generally id. (stating requirements ISP must meet for safe-harbor limita-
tions on liability).
58. See CoStar, 373 F.3d at 549-50 (holding that person must be directly in-
volved with infringing conduct). Infringing conduct occurs when one of the exclu-
sive rights of the Copyright act is violated. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2008).
59. See 373 F.3d 544, 550 (4th Cir. 2004) ("The Nelcom court described this
nexus as requiring some aspect of volition or causation."). According to the court
in CoStar, the nexus must be "sufficiently close and causal to the illegal copying
that one could conclude that the machine owner himself trespassed on the exclu-
sive domain of the copyright owner." See id. Ownership of the machine used for
illegal copying by others is not alone sufficient to find direct infringement. See id.
60. Id. at 549-50 (emphasis in original). The court stated that a customer is
responsible for the copy, not the owner of the copier. See id. at 550. The ISP is
similar to the owner of the copier because both are not actually engaged in the
infringing conduct. See id.
61. See id. at 547 (describing Loopnet's service operation).
62. Id. at 551; cf. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'ns Servs.,
907 F. Supp. 1361, 1370 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (indicating requirement of volition or
causation connecting infringement to defendant).
63. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Webbworld, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 543, 553 (N.D.
Tex. 1997) (holding that automated service can still infringe copyrights), affd, 168
F.3d 486 (5th Cir. 1999) (unpublished decision).
64. See id. (affirming on grounds stated in district court opinion). Playboy
sued defendant Webbworld for displaying images on its website substantially simi-
lar to those owned by Playboy. See id. at 548.
[Vol. 17: p. 135
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court distinguished the case from Netcom by claiming the defend-
ants were not passive conduits of copyright-infringed material. 65
Because Webbworld sold images, and not access to the images, the
court found direct infringement of copyrighted works by the
defendants. 66
C. Time-Shifting and Direct Infringement
Manufacturing and selling a time-shifting device does not vio-
late copyrights. 67 The Supreme Court in Sony Corp. of America v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., ("Sony") decided whether manufacturing
video tape recorders ("VTRs") used by consumers to time-shift, or
record television for later viewing, violated copyrights. 68 The Court
recognized that time-shifting would increase the television viewing
audience for any given show, creating an incentive for content prov-
iders to allow time-shifting. 69 The Court deemed that, without con-
tinued contact between the customer and the manufacturer, a
substantial number of copyright holders would approve the time-
shifting VTR, and the VTR would cause little harm to the potential
market for the content providers' copyrighted works. 70
Operators and publishers of an automated electronic database,
however, violated copyrights when offering copyrighted data to
65. See id. at 552 (noting differences between case and Netcom). The court
labeled Webbworld a "commercial destination within the internet." See id.
Webbworld took "affirmative steps" in creating the copies. See id.
66. See id. at 553 (stating court's conclusion on copyright issue). The district
court analogized Webbworld to a store selling images unlike the defendants in
Netcom who were merely providers of access to the mall. See id. According to the
court, the defendants in Netcom were passive conduits of infringed material and
played no active role in copyright infringement. See id.
67. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 454-56
(1984) (finding that time-shifting does not infringe copyrights).
68. See id. at 419-20.
69. See id. at 443 (detailing benefits of time-shifting for content providers).
Third party conduct, however, is irrelevant to a direct infringement claim. See id.
at 446.
70. See id. at 456 (listing Court's conclusions). The only contact between Sony
and the VTR users was at the moment of sale with no further contact or involve-
ment on Sony's part. See id. at 438. Consequently, Sony was not directly involved
in the infringing conduct. See id. at 456. Furthermore,
Sony demonstrated a significant likelihood that substantial numbers of
copyright holders who license their works for broadcast on free television
would not object to having their broadcasts time-shifted by private view-
ers. And second, respondents failed to demonstrate that time-shifting
would cause any likelihood of nonminimal harm to the potential market
for, or the value of, their copyrighted works.
2010]
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consumers. 7' In N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, ("Tasini") the Supreme
Court corrected a misreading of Sony, stating that the operators and
publishers of an automated electronic database were not just selling
"equipment" used for the actual infringing, but were selling the in-
dividual copyrighted articles not manipulated by the user.7 2 The
Court held that the publishers infringed the authors' exclusive
rights of reproduction and distribution.7 3 The application of Sony
was further defined by the Court in MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster,
Ltd.74 The Court in Grokster explained that a distributor is liable for
infringement by third parties when the product is distributed with
clear expression or other affirmative steps are taken to promote
copyright infringement. 75
Similarly, a copy shop responsible for distributing course pack-
ets to students with copyrighted material infringes copyrights. 76 Sit-
ting en banc, the Sixth Circuit in Princeton University Press v.
Michigan Document Services ("Princeton") noted that, when copying
"was performed on a profit-making basis by a commercial enter-
prise," the for-profit users could not "stand in the shoes of their
customers." 77 The court held the copy shop liable for copyright
71. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 506 (2001) (finding operators
and publishers in violation of copyrights).
72. See id. at 504 ("The Electronic Publishers, however, are not merely selling
'equipment'; they are selling copies of the Articles. And, as we have explained, it is
the copies themselves, without any manipulation by users, that fall outside the
scope of the § 201(c) privilege."). The operators and publishers of the databases
argued that, under Sony, they could only be contributorily liable. See id. at 504.
They also argued that the user manipulated the content by generating specific
search results. See id. at 505. The Court countered that the articles themselves
were not manipulated and were intact as received by the publishers from the au-
thors. See id. at 502.
73. See id. at 506 (providing case holding). The Court decided that the pub-
lishers violated copyrights and were not protected under 17 U.S.C. § 201(c). See id.
74. See 545 U.S. 913, 933 (2005) (clarifying Ninth Circuit's reading of Sony).
The defendant, Grokster, distributed software allowing users to share electronic
files through peer-to-peer networks. See id. at 919. The Court corrected the Ninth
Circuit's reading of Sony's substantial lawful use doctrine. See id. at 933. The Ninth
Circuit held that a producer is never contributorily liable when the product is ca-
pable of substantial lawful use. See id. at 934. The Supreme Court stated that "Sony
barred secondary liability based on presuming or imputing intent to cause in-
fringement solely from the design or distribution of a product capable of substan-
tial lawful use, which the distributor knows is in fact used for infringement." Id. at
933.
75. See id. at 936-37 (detailing application of Sony holding).
76. See Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1389-90
(6th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (determining that copy shop violated copyrights by dis-
tributing to students for profit).
77. Id. at 1389 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Copying for the
purpose of profit by a commercial enterprise does not exempt one from liability.
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infringement because the copy shop's employees, not the custom-
ers, were responsible for the copying. 78
D. Public Performance of a Copyrighted Work
The Copyright Act gives the owner of a copyright the exclusive
right to public performance of the copyrighted work.79 The Copy-
right Act defines performing a work "publicly" as "to transmit or
otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work.., to
the public, by means of any device or process, whether the mem-
bers of the public capable of receiving the performance ... receive
it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at
different times." 0 A passive carrier is exempt from liability if: (1)
the carrier has no control over the content and the recipients of the
transmission; and (2) the passive carrier is merely providing the
means for the retransmission for the use of others.81 Congress
stated that any method of performance or display of images or
sound is a transmission. 82 Further, the Copyright Act governs a
transmission that reaches the public in any form.83 A transmission
is public even if the recipients of a transmission are not gathered in
a single place.84
Retransmission of a television broadcast is a public perform-
ance.8 5 In WGN Continental Broadcasting Co. v. United Video, Inc., the
Seventh Circuit determined that an indirect performance to the
public could violate the Copyright Act.8 6 The court found that
United Video was not a passive carrier because it did not retransmit
the content in exactly the same condition it received the content, a
See id. Specifically, the fair use defense does not apply in such circumstances. See
id.
78. See id. (stating courts holding and reasons for finding copyright
infringement).
79. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2008) (listing copyright owners' exclusive rights).
80. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2008).
81. See 17 U.S.C. § 111 (a) (3) (2008) (providing passive carrier exception).
82. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 64 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5678 (defining transmission).
83. See id. (establishing guidance for Copyright Act).
84. See id. at 64-65 (explaining Congress' interpretation of "public").
85. See WGN Cont'l Broad. Co. v. United Video, Inc., 693 F.2d 622, 625 (7th
Cir. 1982) (discussing application of fight to television rebroadcasts).
86. See id. (finding indirect performances under Copyright Act's definition of
public performance). Indirectly transmitting content to the public by routing the
signal to cable systems did not automatically exempt United Video under the pas-
sive carrier exemption. See id. Finding United Video exempt from infringement
would mean it could "mutilate to its heart's content the broadcast signal it picked
up" without allotting the provider a remedy. Id.
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necessity for passive carrier immunity.8 7 Moreover, in National Foot-
ball League v. PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture, the Second Circuit found
that, although the transmission from the NFL to a satellite was not
"to the public," the transmission of content to the subscribers was
public.8 8
Furthermore, a single viewer can be the public.8 9 In Columbia
Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Redd Home, Inc., ("Redd Homd') the Third
Circuit decided that transmitting a performance to the public-albeit
separately in private rooms-amounted to a public performance
under the Copyright Act.90 The court analogized the services of-
fered in Redd Home to a movie theater with the added convenience
of privacy.9 1 Therefore, the performances were open to the public
even if they were essentially private screenings. 9 2 Following this rea-
soning, another court has held that electronic rentals to the public
through a hotel room service also constituted public
performances. 9
IV. PLAY: THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S ANALYSIS
A. Buffering Data
The Second Circuit focused on whether the buffering of data
by the RS-DVR resulted in a copying of the content providers'
87. See id. ("United Video cannot avail itself of the passive carrier exemption,
because it was not passive - it did not retransmit WGN's signal intact.").
88. 211 F.3d 10, 13 (2d Cir. 2000). PrimeTime provided secondary transmis-
sions of football broadcasts to Canadian subscribers. See id. at 11. The court held
that PrimeTime's transmissions were a step in the process through which the
NFL's copyrighted content reached the public. See id. at 13. The court deter-
mined that the transmission was a public performance under the Copyright Act.
See id.
89. See Columbia Pictures IncAus., Inc. v. Redd Horne, Inc., 749 F.2d 154, 159
(3d Cir. 1984) (finding single viewer constituted public).
90. See id. at 159 (concluding private viewings were public performances).
91. See id. (stating similarities between movie theater and services disputed in
case). Just like movie theaters, the private viewings were open to any member of
the public by paying a fee. See id. The only difference between the movie theater
example and the private viewings was the privacy. See id. Thus, the private view-
ings were essentially open to the public. See id.
92. See id. (reasoning that performances were public).
93. See On Command Video Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 777 F. Supp.
787, 790 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (finding copyright violation where rentals were deliv-
ered electronically to separate hotel rooms). "[A] performance made available by
transmission to the public at large is 'public' even though the recipients are not
gathered in a single place, and even if there is no direct proof that any of the
potential recipients was operating his receiving apparatus at the time of the trans-
mission." Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 83, at 29 (1967)).
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works.9 4 According to the court, for a work to be defined as a
"copy," the work must (1) be "embodied" in a medium, and (2) be
embodied "for a period of more than a transitory duration. -9 5
The Second Circuit found that Cablevision's buffering system
embodied the content providers' works.9 6 The court concluded
that the buffering system met the embodiment requirement be-
cause every second of a work was in the buffer.9 7 However, as noted
previously the analysis does not end with mere embodiment.98 Al-
though some cases only discuss embodiment in "copying," the Sec-
ond Circuit assumed that the "transitory duration" requirement was
not in dispute in those cases.9 9 As to the duration requirement, the
Second Circuit concluded "the works in this case are embodied in
the buffer for only a 'transitory' period, thereby failing the duration
requirement."' 10 0 The data only lasted in the buffer for 1.2 seconds
before it was automatically overwritten after processing. 0 1 There-
fore, the new buffering system does not create copies as defined by
the Copyright Act. 10 2
94. See Cartoon Network L.P. v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 127 (2d Cir.
2008) (discussing issue presented by Cablevision's newly proposed buffering
system).
95. See id. (quoting 2 MELVIL.1,F. B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, Nimmer on Copy-
right § 8.02(B)(3), 8-32 (2007)) (providing requirements of copying under Copy-
right Act). Both requirements must be present for a work to be defined as a copy.
See id. "Unless both requirements are met, the work is not 'fixed' in the buffer,
and, as a result the buffer data is not a 'copy' of the original work whose data is
buffered." Id.
96. See id. at 129 (detailing embodiment requirement). "[A] work's 'embodi-
ment' in either buffer 'is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be per-
ceived, reproduced,' (as in the case of the ingest buffer) 'or otherwise
communicated' (as in the BMR buffer)." Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2008)).
The data either was transmitted through the RS-DVR system, or it would be copied
to the Arroyo Server if requested. See id.
97. See id. (explaining reasoning behind buffering embodiment).
98. See id. (noting that no case law points to embodiment being final step for
analyzing copied works).
99. See id. at 128 (holding "transitory duration" language necessary for work
to be copied). The Second Circuit distinguished this case from MA! Systems by
noting that "transitory duration" was more than likely not in dispute; otherwise,
the Ninth Circuit would have mentioned the topic. See id. at 129. The Second
Circuit stated that "those cases provide no support for the conclusion that the
definition of 'fixed' does not include a duration requirement." Id.
100. Id. at 130.
101. See id. at 129 (stating that data remained in buffer for 1.2 seconds before
being overwritten). Although the data was stored long enough for Cablevision to
make reproductions, the data was never "fixed" in the buffers because it was stored
for no longer than a "transitory" period. See id. at 130.
102. See id. ("Accordingly, the acts of buffering in the operation of the RS-
DVR do not create copies, as the Copyright Act defines that term.").
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B. Creating Playback Copies
Usually, the copyright infringer's identity is not a question for
the court to decide because the plaintiff typically identifies the in-
fringer when filing the claim. 10 3 A central part of the dispute in
this case rested on whether the customer or Cablevision was respon-
sible for the creation of the copy recorded onto the Arroyo Server's
hard disks.104
In copyright law, there must be volition or causation by the
infringer for the infringer to be directly liable. 10 5 Cablevision's pro-
posed volitional conduct consisted of designing, housing and main-
taining the machinery for the customer.10 6 The Second Circuit
stated that the RS-DVR user is similar to the VCR user because the
copy is made automatically upon the user's request. 10 7 The Second
Circuit rejected the district court's argument that Cablevision re-
sembled a copy shop. 10 8 The court differentiated between a human
employee producing a copy and a command sent to a machine to
create a copy.10 9 The Second Circuit reasoned that Cablevision
merely sold customers the ability to use the system, acting more like
103. See id. (expressing problem before court).
104. See id. (proposing that question of who created copies determined
whether Cablevision directly infringed content providers' exclusive rights). If
Cablevision were found to be responsible for creating the copies, it would have
directly infringed on the content providers' exclusive rights; however, if the cus-
tomers were found to be responsible for creating the copies, Cablevision would at
best be contributorily liable - a claim not pursued by the content providers. See
id.
105. See Costar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 550 (4th Cir. 2004)
(holding that "[t] here must be actual infringing conduct with a nexus sufficiently
close and causal" for there to be direct liability); see aLso Religious Tech. Ctr. v.
Netcom On-Line Commc'ns Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1370 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (rea-
soning that volition or causation is essential element). Being a third party does not
automatically violate copyrights. See id.
106. See Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 131 (stating Cablevision's volitional
conduct).
107. See id. (stating that RS-DVR automatically creates copies at customer's
command). The Second Circuit analogized Cablevision's role to that of a VCR,
noting that the person who presses the record button on the VCR provides the
necessary volitional act for direct infringement. See id.
108. See id. (finding district court's reasoning for finding Cablevision directly
liable flawed).
109. See id. (highlighting differences between copy shop and Cablevision). In
Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Services, a copy shop distributed
course packets to students with copyrighted material from professors who provided
material to the shop. See 99 F.3d 1381, 1384 (6th Cir. 1996). The Fourth Circuit
found that the shop directly infringed because this shop was a direct participant of
the copying. See id. at 1391.
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a proprietor of the store.110 Thus, the Second Circuit found that
the RS-DVR customers were responsible for making the copies
through the RS-DVR system. 11
Relying on Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studies,
Inc., the Second Circuit distinguished direct infringement from
contributory infringement.'1 2 The court reasoned that explicitly
separating direct and contributory infringement followed the con-
gressional intent of the Copyright Act to "not expressly render any-
one liable for infringement committed by another."' 13 According
to the court, "the doctrine of contributory liability stands ready to
provide adequate protection to copyrighted works."' 14 Therefore,
the court determined that Cablevision's part in recording the con-
tent did not rise to the level of direct infringement.1
1 5
C. Transmission of Data to the Customer
Finally, the content providers claimed that the transmission of
copied data to customers violated the content providers' exclusive
right of public performance. 1 6 The Copyright Act provides that
performing a work "publicly" means "to transmit or otherwise com-
municate a performance or display of the work ... to the public."'1 17
Neither party disputed whether the RS-DVR playback transmits to
the customer.1 18 The Second Circuit did not decide, however,
110. See Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 132 (describing Cablevision as store pro-
prietor). Cablevision also lacked control over what content would be recorded by
the customer, therefore playing a less active role in the copying itself. See id.
111. See id. (concluding that customers, for purposes of copyright infringe-
ment, made copies, not Cablevision).
112. See id. at 132-33 (referencing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 434 (1984) (noting Supreme Court's decision regarding con-
tributory infringement in Sony). The Sony Court maintained a "meaningful distinc-
tion" between contributory infringement and direct infringement that the Second
Circuit preserved. See id.
113. Id. at 133. The Second Circuit also determined that:
If Congress had meant to assign direct liability to both the person who
actually commits a copyright-infringing act and any person who actively
induces that infringement, the Patent Act tells us that it knew how to
draft a statute that would have this effect. Because Congress did not do
so, the Sony Court concluded that '[tihe Copyright Act does not ex-
pressly render anyone liable for infringement committed by another.'
See id. (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at 434).
114. Id. at 132.
115. See id. at 133 (concluding that reproduction of content would not create
direct liability for Cablevision).
116. See id. at 134 (considering final theory of content providers' claim).
117. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2008).
118. See Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 134 (noting that transmission to cus-
tomer not in dispute).
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whether Cablevision "performs" the work to the customer because
the court found that the transmission was not "to the public."' 19
Determining who is "capable of receiving" the transmitted per-
formance is imperative for deciding whether the performance is
made "to the public." 120 Cablevision's RS-DVR operates by trans-
mitting a copy of the previously recorded content, which is decoded
only by that individual's cable box, to the individual subscriber who
requested the recording. 121 The Second Circuit rejected the dis-
trict court's interpretation of the transmission clause. 122 According
to the Second Circuit, the transmission clause focuses on the audi-
ence receiving a particular "transmission" or "performance," not
the underlying "work."'123
On appeal, the content providers contended that Cablevision
sends the "same performance" of a work to customers when it trans-
mits through the RS-DVR playback. 124 The Second Circuit rejected
this argument because it could lead to inappropriate applications
of the law, such as holding a person liable for copyright infringe-
ment for transmitting the "original performance" of a work by re-
cording a program and subsequently watching the tape in another
room.' 25 The court claimed that prior jurisprudence pointed to-
119. See id. ("We need not address Cablevision's first argument further be-
cause, even if we assume that Cablevision makes the transmission when an RS-DVR
playback occurs, we find that the RS-DVR playback, as described here, does not
involve the transmission of a performance 'to the public."').
120. See id. (determining whether transmission is made public is relevant to
deciding if right has been infringed). Legislative history of the Copyright Act sup-
ports the thesis that exactly who receives the transmission plays a large role in
determining whether the work is made "to the public." Id. at 134-35
121. See id. at 135 (detailing how RS-DVR transmits data to customer who re-
quested recording of that content). Cablevision's RS-DVR only transmits the copy
to the one subscriber responsible for the creation of the copy, making that person
alone capable of receiving the individualized copy. See id. at 137. The content
providers argued that it was irrelevant that the copies would be "unique" copies of
the original work. See id. Finding no support for this argument, the Second Cir-
cuit turned to its interpretation of the transmit clause and concluded that "any
factor that limits the potential audience of a transmission is relevant." Id.
122. See id. at 135 (explaining difference in interpretation). The underlying
work is the show, while the transmission is the unique copy sent to each individual.
See id. The district court defined the potential audience as the entire group set to
receive the underlying work, not a particular transmission. See id.
123. See id. at 136 (interpreting statutory language drafters considered non-
public transmissions when drafting narrow language of statute).
124. See id. (detailing argument by content providers on appeal that Cablevi-
sion provides "same performance"). "Thus, according to [the content providers],
when Congress says that to perform a work publicly means to transmit ... a per-
formance ... to the public, they really meant 'transmit... the "original perform-
ance" . . . to the public.'" Id.
125. See id. (rejecting argument by content providers that Cablevision would
be providing "original performance").
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ward looking downstream to the potential audience, not upstream
to the provider's intended initial audience. 126 Therefore, although
the initial audience was the public, the particular transmission to
the individual subscriber did not result in a copy made "to the
public."' 127
The Second Circuit distinguished this case from On Command,
reasoning that the holding conflicted with the court's interpreta-
tion of the transmission clause because the On Command court
broadly defined any commercial transmission as a transmission "to
the public." 128 Additionally, the Second Circuit determined that
the Third Circuit's interpretation of the distribution clause that
"even one person can be the public" did not require the Second
Circuit to find one person to qualify as the public. 129 Thus, the
transmission of the data by Cablevision would not constitute direct
infringement under the transmission clause because the transmis-
sions were not "to the public".1 30
In conclusion, the Second Circuit found that the proposed RS-
DVR system would not directly infringe on the content providers'
exclusive rights to reproduce and publicly perform their copy-
righted works. 131 The court reversed the district court's grant of
summary judgment, vacating the district court's injunction against
Cablevision and remanding the case for further proceedings. 132
126. See id. at 137 (reasoning that performance would be made "to the public"
if receiving audience of copy was public rather than initial audience). The content
providers relied on National Football League to argue that when the stream is split
and transmitted to the RS-DVR, Cablevision is publicly performing the work. See
id. (delivering second argument based on National Football League). The court re-
jected this argument, stating that the National Football League court did not decide
on the issue and only focused on the final transmission in the chain of the per-
formance. See id.
127. See id. (discussing downstream effect of transmission).
128. See id. 139 (disagreeing with On Commands interpretation of transmis-
sion clause). The Second Circuit contended that a transmission is not always pub-
lic. See id. To find every transmission public would rewrite the statutory language.
See id.
129. See id. (distinguishing cases from present case). The transmissions in On
Command were identical to one another. See id. Therefore, an identical video
could be shown to multiple viewers successively. See id. The transmission clause,
however, requires that the court look at the potential audience of the transmission
at issue. See id.
130. See id. (examining transmission of data).
131. See id. at 140 (providing holding of case).
132. See id. (concluding case).
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V. REPLAY: DID THE SECOND CIRCUIT CHANGE THE CHANNEL?
A. The Exclusive Right to Reproduction
1. The Buffer Data
The Second Circuit distinguished the buffer data in the case
from the RAM of MAI Systems by requiring that the data be stored
for a "transitory duration" for the data to be fixed.1 33 1n MAI Systems,
the Ninth Circuit stated that no facts indicated that the RAM did
not fix the data. 134 The data was repeatedly overwritten as opposed
to the data in MAI Systems.135 Here, the data was stored for, at most,
1.2 seconds before being overwritten. 136 The court determined
that 1.2 seconds was not enough time for the work to "be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than
transitory duration. ' 13 7 Thus, the court determined that 1.2
seconds was not long enough for the work to be properly "fixed," as
required by the Copyright Act. 138
The MAI Systems court focused on the "sufficiently permanent
or stable" language of the statute, the Second Circuit decided that
the court in MA Systems was not ultimately faced with the issue of
duration. 139 Conversely, other courts have relied upon the dura-
tional requirement. 140 The Netcom court, noting MA! Systems, found
that storing messages for eleven days qualified them as copies
133. See id. at 129 (distinguishing case from MA Systems).
134. See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir.
1993) ("After reviewing the record, we find no specific facts (and Peak points to
none) which indicate that the copy created in the RAM is not fixed.").
135. See Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 129-30 (isolating differences between
RAM data and buffer data of RS-DVR). One commentator posits that a poem writ-
ten in sand and washed away by the ocean would not satisfy the durational require-
ment because it can only be perceived for a short time. See Ned Snow, Article: The
TiVo Question: Does Skipping Commercials Violate Copyright Law, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV.
27, 38 (2005) (discussing embodiment of work requiring more than transitory
duration).
136. See Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 130 (calculating amount of time data is
embodied during buffering process).
137. Id. at 129. The court reasoned that 1.2 seconds constituted a "transitory
duration" and that the data was not "fixed" for a substantial amount of time. See id.
Thus, the court distinguished the present facts from MAI Systems because in MA/
Systems the storage of data was much longer. See id.
138. See id. at 130 (stating that works would not be fixed in RS-DVR buffer
data).
139. See id. at 129 (emphasizing that AIJ Systems did not deal with durational
requirement).
140. See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n Servs., Inc.,
907 F. Supp. 1361, 1368 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (providing "transitory duration" require-
ment in MAI Systems); CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 551 (4th
Cir. 2004) (defining "transitory duration" requirement).
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under the Copyright Act.141 The Fourth Circuit, in Costar, stated
that "[w]hile temporary electronic copies may be made in this
transmission process, they would appear not to be 'fixed' in the
sense that they are 'of more than transitory duration. ' "'142 The
court asserted that the transitory duration requirement looks not
only at the length of the transmission but also at the type of trans-
mission. 143 The RS-DVR buffering system in Cable News Network is
similar to the ISP in CoStar because both systems are automated and
are only steps in the transmission of data.144 Therefore, the data in
this case was not "fixed" because it would not be stored long
enough and the transmission would be automatic.145
The Copyright Office does not recognize a durational require-
ment, yet the Second Circuit pointed out that it is not bound by the
Copyright Office's report. 146 Moreover, the court found the rea-
soning of the report questionable because a failure to recognize a
durational requirement reads the "transitory duration" language
out of the statute.147 Although the Copyright Office does not rec-
ognize a durational requirement, it did not explicitly state that
141. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1368 (finding that eleven days was sufficient
for violation of Copyright Act). "Even though the messages remained on their
systems for at most eleven days, they were sufficiently 'fixed' to constitute recogniz-
able copies under the Copyright Act." Id. The court seemed hesitant to find the
messages fixed when they were being overwritten. See id.
142. CoStar, 373 F.3d at 551. The Fourth Circuit does cite to MAI Systems in
explaining that its holding does not mean a person downloading copyrighted ma-
terial onto a computer is incapable of copyright infringement. See id.
143. See id. (" 'Transitory duration' is thus both a qualitative and quantitative
characterization. It is quantitative insofar as it describes the period during which
the function occurs, and it is qualitative in the sense that it describes the status of
transition."). According to the court, when a computer owner downloads copy-
righted material, it is no longer stored for a transitory duration because the com-
puter owner now possesses the material. See id.
144. Compare id. (contrasting person who downloads copyrighted works onto
their computer with ISP which transmits data to user for user's own use) with Car-
toon Network L.P. v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 129-30 (2d Cir. 2008) (stat-
ing buffering system process' relationship to 'transitory duration').
145. See Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 130 (finding data not stored for more
than "transitory duration").
146. See id. at 129 (rejecting plaintiffs' argument that Copyright Office's read-
ing of Copyright Act is binding).
147. See id. (finding report unpersuasive). The report states that "attempting
to draw a line based on duration may be impossible." U.S. Copyright Office,
DMCA Section 104 Report at 113 (Aug. 2001), available at http://www.copyfight.gov/
reports/studies/dmca/sec-1 04-report-vol-i.pdf. Courts have taken a factual analy-
sis when determining the transitory duration requirement, demonstrating that it is
possible. See, e.g., Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 130 (holding that 1.2 seconds does
not meet transitory duration requirement); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-
Line Commc'n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1368 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (determining
whether eleven days satisfied transitory duration requirement).
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none existed.1 48 The Second Circuit relied on Nimmer on Copyright
in finding a durational requirement as it was written into the stat-
ute, and since no reason existed to follow the Copyright Office, the
Second Circuit held instead that a durational requirement does ex-
ist.14 9 Consequently, the Second Circuit was correct in finding no
direct infringement by the buffering system because the data was
never "fixed" for a "transitory duration. '" 150
2. Creating Playback Copies
In Cable News Network, the Second Circuit found that Cablevi-
sion's automated RS-DVR system could not exercise the necessary
volitional conduct for the creation of playback copies to rise to the
level of direct infringement. 151 The Netcom court required that
some element of volitional conduct or causation be present to find
a third party in direct violation of copyright. 152 The Supreme
Court in Sony determined that a VTR did not infringe copyrights
directly or indirectly because the manufacturer of the VTR only
sold the machine to the customer and was therefore not responsi-
ble for pressing the record button on the machine.' 53 Through the
RS-DVR, Cablevision controls, maintains and houses an automated
system to record the content the customer has requested. 54 Thus,
there is more volitional conduct in the present case than in Sony
because the relationship between the customer and Cablevision ex-
tends beyond providing the RS-DVR hardware. 155 The Second Cir-
cuit posited that Cablevision is similar to a proprietor of a store
148. See Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 129 (locating nothing explicit in report
against "fixed" definition including durational requirement).
149. See id. at 127-29 (referencing Nimnmr on Copyright for durational require-
ment and finding Copyright Office's report unpersuasive).
150. See id. at 130 (finding no violation of copyright act through buffering
system).
151. See id. at 133 (deciding that RS-DVR operation would not include voli-
tional conduct required for direct infringement). The automated service is a pas-
sive conduit, with the customer responsible for creating the copy. See id.
152. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1370 (requiring element of causation or voli-
tional conduct for copyright infringement).
153. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 44142
(1984) (determining that VTR manufacturer did not infringe copyrights because
manufacturer was not connected to infringing conduct sufficiently). Sony manu-
factured and sold the machine with no further contact existing between it and the
customer. See id.
154. See Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 131 (stating Cablevision's volitional
conduct).
155. See id. (concluding that volitional conduct of Cablevision is similar to
conduct of VTR manufacturer). The RS-DVR is housed by Cablevision and the
machinery is automatically creating copies, whereas in Sony the VTR is only pro-
duced and sold by Sony. See id. at 124-25.
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because Cablevision will provide access to store merchandise. 156
The content providers argued that the proposed RS-DVR is more
like the copy shop in Princeton.157 The Second Circuit correctly
stated that this analogy fails because the court in Princeton focused
on the conduct of human employees creating the copies; whereas
for the RS-DVR, a customer pushes the record button and an auto-
mated time-shifting service creates the copy. 158
Alternatively, Cablevision's RS-DVR is similar to the ISPs in CoS-
tar and Playboy.159 Here, however, Cablevision is not "actually en-
gaging" in infringing conduct; rather, Cablevision is simply selling
access to this technology, not the content itself, as customers al-
ready receive the content, regardless of whether they utilize the RS-
DVR.160 Moreover, as pointed out by the Second Circuit, Cablevi-
sion is not in control of what content the customer records beyond
allowing the user to record content to which they already sub-
scribe. 16 1 Therefore, the RS-DVR is an intermediary between a copy
shop and a VTR, and because there is no volitional conduct and no
156. See id. at 132 (analogizing store owner to Cablevision).
157. See id. at 131 (noting content providers' analogy of RS-DVR to copy shop
in Princeton).
158. See id. at 131-32 (rejecting content providers' analogy to Princeton copy
shop). The copy shop in Princeton distributed the course packets to students. See
Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1384 (6th Cir. 1996)
(finding copy shop not liable for reproducing copyright works). The copy shop
physically produced the course packets. See id. Moreover, the Princeton court fo-
cused primarily on the plaintiffs fair use defense rather than the connection be-
tween the copy shop and the copying because this connection was quite obvious.
See id. at 1385-90.
159. See, e.g., CoStar Group, Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 556 (4th Cir.
2004) (holding that ISP owner's volitional conduct did not rise to level of infringe-
ment required); Playboy Enters. v. Webbworld, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 543, 552-53 (N.D.
Tex. 1997) (stating that ISP owner is only providing access to images whereas de-
fendant sold images), aff'd, 168 F.3d 486 (5th Cir. 1999) (unpublished decision).
160. See Playboy, 991 F. Supp. at 553 (asserting that party acting as link be-
tween customers and transmission of data should not be held liable). The court in
CoStar stated that holding persons in violation of the Copyright Act liable for own-
ership, operation, or maintenance of a transmission facility would miss the inten-
tion of the Copyright Act. See CoStar, 373 F.3d at 551 ("To conclude that these
persons are copyright infringers simply because they are involved in the owner-
ship, operation, or maintenance of a transmission facility that automatically
records material-copyrighted or not-would miss the thrust of the protections af-
forded by the Copyright Act."). See Cartoon Network L.P. v. CSC Holdings, Inc.,
536 F.3d 121, 131 (2d Cir. 2008) (asserting Second Circuit noted that Cablevision
only controlled, maintained and housed system used for RS-DVR). By holding
Cablevision liable the courts will miss the "thrust" of the Copyright Act. See id.
(declaring liability would violate intent of Copyright Act). Compare CoStar, 373 F.3d
at 551 (indicating conflict with purpose of Copyright Act), with Cartoon Network,
536 F.3d at 131 (drawing similarities between conduct in CoStar and present case).
161. See Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 125 (noting that customers can only ac-
cess content they recorded).
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employee involved, there is likely no direct infringement by
Cablevision. 162
In support of their Petition for Writ of Certiorari, the content
providers pointed out that the Second Circuit neglected to com-
ment on the Supreme Court's decision in Tasini regarding copy-
right infringement by automated services. 163 The holding in Tasini,
however, that an automated service can be held liable for copyright
infringement, does not mean that every automated service is liable
for infringement. 164 As noted above, the requisite volitional con-
duct does not exist here because Cablevision is not responsible for
what customers record on the RS-DVR. 165 Cablevision simply pro-
vides the technology for the customer to record, or time-shift, con-
tent they already receive. 166
Additionally, the content providers argued that Congress never
intended immunity for non-internet providers like Cablevision's RS-
DVR under the Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation
Act. 167 Hence, Congress only intended to narrowly apply the safe-
harbor provision to ISPs. 168 Cablevision, however, asserted that the
Fourth Circuit rejected this very argument in CoStar. 69 The CoStar
court, quoting from the Act itself, reasoned that immunity does not
exclusively extend to ISPs. 170 Therefore, Cablevision did not create
162. See id. at 131-32 (distinguishing RS-DVR from VTR and copy shop).
163. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d 121 (Oct.
6, 2008) (No. 08-448) 2008 WL 4484597 ("Petition for Writ") (contending that
court misapplied Sony and omitted analysis of Tasini).
164. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 504 (2001) (emphasizing that
ruling focuses on creation of copies not access to copies). The Court distinguished
selling equipment from selling the copies themselves. See id. "The Electronic Pub-
lishers, however, are not merely selling 'equipment'; they are selling copies of the
Articles. And, as we have explained, it is the copies themselves, without any manip-
ulation by users, that fall outside the scope of the § 201(c) privilege." Id.
165. See Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 133 (finding no volitional conduct by
Cablevision).
166. See id. at 124-25 (demonstrating how RS-DVR operates).
167. See Petition for Writ, supra note 163, at 26 (contending that Online Copy-
right Infringement Liability Limitation Act narrows exemption to ISPs).
168. See id. at 27 ("If automated services were immune from direct liability
when they automatically respond to user requests, there would have been no need
for Congress to create very narrow and highly qualified ISP safe-harbors under
these circumstances.").
169. See Brief of Respondents in Opposition to Petitioners for Writ of Certio-
rari at 16, Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d 121 (U.S. Dec. 5, 2008) (No. 08-448 ) 2008 WL
5168381 ("Brief of Respondents") (citing CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373
F.3d 544, 552-55 (4th Cir. 2004)) (reasoning that CoStar court rejected this same
argument when issue was before court).
170. See CoStar, 373 F.3d at 552 (noting that Copyright Act does not preclude
other services from gaining immunity). The Copyright Act does not exempt prov-
iders from other arguments under the law. See id. The court concluded that "Con-
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playback copies because there was no volitional conduct and immu-
nity is not solely reserved for ISPs.17 1
B. The Exclusive Right of Public Performance
The Second Circuit held that Cablevision's RS-DVR did not vio-
late the content providers' exclusive right of public performance
when it retransmitted content to customers. 172 The Second Circuit
found that such transmissions were not made "to the public," so the
court did not reach the question of whether Cablevision performed
the work.173
The Second Circuit's conclusion possibly creates a circuit con-
flict for two reasons. 174 First, simply retransmitting data does not
immunize a party from liability for copyright infringement.17 5
Cablevision did not dispute that it transmitted previously recorded
content to customers who requested the recording. 176 Second,
transmission to a single person can be considered "public."177 The
content providers maintain that the Second Circuit's holding, that
a single customer who receives the data is not the public, creates a
circuit conflict.1 78 The Third Circuit, in Redd Home, found a store
in violation of copyrights when it played movies in private rooms for
gress did not preempt the decision in Netcom nor foreclose the continuing
development of liability through court decisions interpreting §§ 106 and 501 of
the Copyright Act." Id.
171. See Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 134 (ruling no volitional conduct by
Cablevision).
172. See id. (concluding no violation of content providers' exclusive right of
public performance).
173. See id. ("We need not address Cablevision's first argument further be-
cause, even if we assume that Cablevision makes the transmission when an RS-DVR
playback occurs, we find that the RS-DVR playback, as described here, does not
involve the transmission of a performance 'to the public.'").
174. See Petition for Writ, supra note 163, at 35-36 (contending that decision
creates circuit conflict).
175. See WGN Cont'l Broad. Co. v. United Video, Inc., 693 F.2d 622, 625 (7th
Cir.1982) (stating that intermediate carriers are not automatically immune from
copyright violations); see also Nat'l Football League v. PrimeTime 24Joint Venture,
211 F.3d 10, 13 (2d Cir. 2000) (indicating that retransmitting data violated
copyrights).
176. See Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 137 (highlighting audience of public per-
formance, rather than nature of retransmission).
177. See Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Redd Home, Inc., 749 F.2d 154, 159
(3d Cir. 1984) (holding private screenings public); see also On Command Video
Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 777 F. Supp. 787, 790 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (finding
copyright violation for electronic transmissions to single rooms).
178. See Petition for Writ, supra note 163, at 35-36 ("Thus, the Second Cir-
cuit's 'conclusion that, under the transmit clause, we must examine the potential
audience of a given transmission ... to determine whether that transmission is "to
the public,"' Pet. App. 36a, creates a Circuit conflict.").
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its customers. 179 Customers paid for the content, while the service
offered by the store simply gave customers privacy, creating a de
facto private movie theater 180 Cablevision argued, however, that
the two are distinguishable: the service in Redd Home is similar to a
public phone booth where one person is allowed in at a time for
the same service, whereas the service offered by Cablevision is most
similar to access to a house given only to the house builder.1 8 1 The
latter reasoning is more persuasive because it accounts for the fac-
tual differences between the two cases.' 8 2 Thus, Cablevision did
not violate the content providers' right to exclusive performance by
allowing customers to watch self-recorded content. 83
VI. COMING ATTRACTIONS
The Supreme Court has readjusted previous courts' interpreta-
tions of Sony on more than one occasion.18 4 Here, the Second Cir-
cuit relied heavily on its own reading of Sony, yet that reading
provides a clear and logical progression consistent with prior prece-
179. See Redd Home, 749 F.2d at 159 (establishing that store owners violated
Copyright Act).
180. See id. (drawing analogy between services offered by cablevision and ser-
vices officered by movie theaters).
181. See Brief of Respondents, supra note 169, at 28 (distinguishing facts of
Cartoon Network from Redd Home).
A phone booth is "public" because anyone willing to pay can use it - even though
only one person occupies it at a time. But a house open only to the person who
built it is not "public." Similarly, videos in a VOD library are offered "to the public"
via transmission because anyone willing to pay can view them - even though, once
a transmission begins, only one person actually receives it. But RS-DVR recordings
are not available "to the public." Each one is available for transmission solely to the
customer who made in it.
Id.; see also Redd Home, 749 F.2d at 159 (3d Cir. 1984) ("Any member of the public
can view a motion picture by paying the appropriate fee. The services provided by
Maxwell's are essentially the same as a movie theatre, with the additional feature of
privacy."). Therefore, the primary difference between the facts of Redd Home and
Cartoon Network is the individualization of the content and who is able to view the
content. See id.
182. Cf Cartoon Network L.P. v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 125 (2d
Cir. 2008) (comparing RS-DVR with VOD system). The Second Circuit noted that
the difference between the RS-DVR and a VOD system is the individualization of
the content the RS-DVR user receives. See id.
183. See id. at 134 (finding no violation of content providers' right of exclusive
public performance).
184. See, e.g., MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936-37 (2005)
(correcting Circuit Court's reading of Sony's substantial lawful use doctrine); N.Y.
Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 519 (2001) (applying law from Sony correctly).
For a further discussion on the Supreme Court's Sony jurisprudence, see supra
notes 67-78 and accompanying text.
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dent, negating any need for readjustment. 185 Moreover, the voli-
tional or causation requirement in creating copies correctly applies
relevant case law. 186 The Second Circuit's decision follows Netcom's
volitional conduct requirement and its progeny's reading of the
Copyright Act. 187 Cartoon Network will guide future cases regarding
digital copying of a work and exclusive rights of public
performance. 188
Courts continually try to balance the competing interests of
promoting the free exchange of ideas with preserving the rights of
artists and authors. 189 The proposed RS-DVR will dramatically
change the relationship between customers and their DVRs because
customers will no longer need their stand-alone DVR system. 190
Furthermore, the Second Circuit's ruling that the RS-DVR does not
constitute copyright infringement may increase the role of DVRs by
consumers. 9 1 Recent studies show that DVR users skip the majority
of advertisements, creating a disincentive for advertisers to invest
money into advertising on television.1 9 2 In fact, potential for harm
185. For a further discussion of the court's Sony interpretation, see supra
notes 153-158 and accompanying text.
186. But see Petition for Writ, supra note 163 at 28 (scrutinizing lower courts
which have relied heavily on Netcom ruling). There is concern that lower courts are
treating Netcom as a ruling by the Supreme Court of the United States. See id.
187. See Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 131 (requiring evidence of volitional con-
duct by Cablevision to prove direct infringement).
188. See Lewis R. Clayton, New RS-DVR System: Not a Direct Violation of Copyrights,
N.Y. LJ., Sept. 10, 2008, available at http://www.paulweiss.com/files/Publication/
1 c9401 ae-44b0-4ddf-8dba-41062cf4e9e9/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/
74e5117e-79cd-45db-9f8c-47bdO8lcdlab/IPL1OSepO8.pdf (predicting that future
court battles will rely on opinion when deciding similar issues); see also Kent Gib-
bons, Cablevision Network DVR Ruling Has Web Radio Impact, MULTICHANNEL NEWS,
Aug. 11, 2008, available at http://www.multichannel.com/article/82280-Cablevi-
sionNetwork DVRRuling-HasWebRadioImpact.php (assessing impact of
Second Circuit's ruling on Web Radio case).
189. For a further discussion of these competing interests, see supra notes 37-
39 and accompanying text.
190. See Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 123-24 (comparing stand-alone DVRs
with RS-DVR)
191. See Brian Stelter, A Ruling May Pave the Way for Broader Use of DVR, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 5, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/05/business/media/05
adco.html?ref=business (discussing impact of ruling on DVR use). The Cartoon
Network decision will allow cable providers the ability to market DVR capability al-
ready included in set-top boxes without the set-top box. See id. This will greatly
expand the amount of viewers with DVR capability. See id. Cablevision considers
the ruling a great victory for consumers because DVRs will become more available,
faster and less expensive. See Mike Farrell, 'Huge Win' on Net DVR, MULTICHANNEL
NEWS, Aug. 10, 2008, http://www.multichannel.com/article/134281-_HugeWin_
on-Net_.DVR.php (reporting Second Circuit's decision).
192. See Snow, supra note 135, at 32 (detailing relationships of DVRs, adver-
tisements and content providers); see also Nielsen Finds Most DVR Viewers Skip Com-
mercials, BOSTON GLOBE, June 1, 2007, available at http://www.boston.com/
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is so great that an ABC executive expressed the desire for DVR
manufacturers to disable the fast-forward button on newly released
DVRs.193 Nonetheless, "[detractors] never explain how a court
could deem Cablevision a direct infringer without also banning the
27 million set-top DVRs that cable and satellite companies already
provide."1 9 4
Peter Hamner*
business/technology/articles/2007/06/01 /nielsen findsmost dvr viewers-skip_
commercials/ (reporting Nielsen finding that DVR users skip commercials); Far-
rell, supra note 191 (noting content providers worry over mass DVR use). "By skip-
ping commercials, DVR users jeopardize the creative incentives underlying a
network's efforts to produce quality programming." Snow, supra note 136, at 32.
Accordingly, the potential for harm to content providers is an increasing reality.
See id.
193. See David Goetzl & Wayne Friedman, ABC Looks Beyond Upftont To DVR,
Commercial Ratings Issues, MEDIA DAILY NEWS, July 6, 2006, http://www.mediapost.
com/publications/?fa=articles.showArticle&artaid=45264 (mentioning reaction
to DVR use and ability to skip advertisements).
194. Brief of Respondents, supra note 169, at 21. The difference between the
RS-DVR and set-top DVRs is the storage location of the recording. See id.
* J.D Candidate, May 2010, Villanova University School of Law; B.A., Univer-
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